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A. Introduction
When the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights ('African Charter') was adopted 30 years ago debate, in particular, scholarly debate on the new African human rights system focused on its provisions and whether, what on paper appeared to be a toothless, African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights ('African Commission') would have any effect on promoting and protecting the broad range of rights contained in the African Charter. Over the years, the African Commission developed standards on the various provisions of the African Charter through the adoption of resolutions or general comments, and through the various activities of its special procedures. It has received over 400 communications, nearly all from individuals, organisations or groups alleging violations of the rights in the ACHPR. In 2006 it was joined by the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights ('African Court') which has have since received cases and adopted, albeit a few, judgments.
It is only relatively recently, however, perhaps in line with shifts at the international level and among human rights funders that attention has been paid to what happens post-decision or judgment, 1 and whether many of these documents and standards elaborated by the African Commission and decisions and judgments adopted by the African Commission and African Court actually result in any meaningful change on the ground. This article draws upon preliminary findings from a collaborative research project examining the implementation of cases from the African Court and Commission, as well as the regional treaty bodies in Europe and the Americas and some of the treaty bodies in the UN. 2 This article focuses on the monitoring of implementation of decisions and judgments of the African Commission and African Court, and not on other findings such as concluding observations or resolutions. We use the term 'implementation' to refer to the process by which individual or collective measures are taken (through legislation, judicial decision, administrative action, executive decree, or other steps) to give effect to an adverse judgment/decision.
3 This is distinguished from 'compliance', which is a status which is attained if and when a State's law and practice are in line with the requirements of the judgment or decision, as interpreted by the responsible international body. 4 Thus, compliance is understood as the outcome of implementation: a state implements a judgment/decision in order to ensure that it is in compliance with its obligations under this ruling. The African system bodies use the terms 'monitor' or 'follow-up' to decisions and judgments which we consider broader terms to cover the formal and informal processes of oversight of the human rights bodies and it is these which this article examines. Whilst acknowledging that the monitoring of implementation cannot be the sole responsibility of the respective treaty bodies, this article concentrates specifically on their role. The contribution of the other AU organs, including the Assembly of the Union, Executive Council, Peace and Security Council (PSC), Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC), the AU Commission as well as the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), will be touched upon but as they form the basis of another article in this collection will not be dealt with fully here.
B. What role should these bodies play?
It is first worth reiterating that it is clear from our research that the African Commission and African Court should themselves play some role in monitoring implementation of their own decisions and judgments. Firstly, it gives them a sense of ownership, as interviewees told us: the African Court 'still need(s) to know if the decision has been implemented or not in case [it needs] to issue other orders, or draw parties to other cases'; further: 'it is good to see that your decisions are implemented and monitored'. In addition, the bodies are then able to assess their own impact and consequently amend their practices accordingly. The ability to indicate examples of where States have implemented also contributes to enhancing the legitimacy and credibility of the body itself. This will then 'build confidence in the institution': 'the Court should work towards the ideal position, where compliance with its decisions impacts on the Respondent State's legitimacy among its peers, in other words, non-compliance with the Court's decisions will have adverse consequences to States which they cannot afford to ignore. The Court should continue undertaking its work with independence and integrity without fear of repercussions from Member States. It should avoid self-censoring, which could arise from a fear of noncompliance with its decisions or a fear of active backlash against it'.
5
From our research we would suggest grouping monitoring implementation into two categories: that which can be viewed as reactive (for example, receiving information on the extent to which the State has implemented any recommendations or orders) and proactive (e.g. going out and seeking information where it is lacking; cross-checking that evidence and validating what has been said; and then also making assessments on whether this is sufficient or not based on some clear criteria of what is satisfactory implementation).
Our research has found that the African Commission and African Court play, or are considered to play, a variety of different roles when it comes to 'monitoring' implementation. These include: information gathering; reporting; dialogue with the parties; interpretation and technical assistance; assessment; coordination; and enforcement. Our terminology recognises, but does not necessarily equate with, proposals made by the African Court itself in consideration of Articles 29 and 30 of the Protocol (see below).
'Information-gathering' we consider to mean receiving and/or seeking evidence from the parties to the case as well as other actors on what measures States have undertaken to implement the decision or judgment. This may take the form of direct questions to the State delegation during consideration of State reports, holding implementation hearings, correspondence to parties and visits to relevant stakeholders at the domestic level.
'Reporting' encompasses informing others, including organs of the AU and other national and international actors, of the measures taken by the State. 'Dialogue' entails that the monitoring body will work with the two parties to the communication either through offering 'good offices' or facilitating meetings to discuss the implementation of the measures.
'Interpretation and technical assistance' is where the monitoring body will provide further clarification on what the specifics of its recommendations and orders mean. 'Assessment' is the evaluation of the extent to which the State has implemented the recommendations or orders. In addition, the bodies can also play a role in coordinating efforts to monitor implementation with other bodies at the national or regional level. The 'naming and shaming' through the publication of lists of States that have failed to implement; Rules 118 (1) consequences may flow from the failure to implement. These various forms of monitoring are not always distinct, neither are they mutually exclusive.
A related issue is that whatever role these bodies play must not impact on their neutrality and independence. This applies equally to the African Commission as to the African Court. The legitimacy and credibility of the bodies comes in part from the perception of them as independent and their ability to be resolute in the face of pressures from States or other actors. Some of the tasks employed in monitoring implementation potentially could compromise this neutrality. So, for example, on the one hand one might see the benefits for a Commissioner who lived in the State against which decision was adopted to be a source of expertise for the State authorities when determining how to implement that decision. On the other, his or her lack of engagement with the case prior to its adoption, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure to ensure their neutrality, does not make this a straightforward proposition.
Bearing in mind the importance of independence, the question then becomes: what roles do the treaty provisions and rules of procedure presume?
C. Treaty Provisions and Rules of Procedure/Rules of Court
Article 1 of the ACHPR requires States Parties to 'recognise the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in the Charter' and to 'undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to them'. The African Commission has a broad mandate in Article 45 to promote, protect and interpret the ACHPR and Article 46 further enables it to 'resort to any appropriate method of investigation'; it may hear from the Chairperson of the AU Commission or any other person capable of enlightening it. Rule 98(4) of the African Commission's Rules of Procedure requires the State to report to the African Commission on measures taken to implement provisional measures. Rule 112 has further detail on 'follow-up' on the recommendations of the Commission. This provides:
1. After the consideration of the Commission's Activity Report by the Assembly, the Secretary shall notify the parties within thirty (30) days that they may disseminate the decision. 2. In the event of a decision against a State Party, the parties shall inform the Commission in writing, within one hundred and eighty (180) days of being informed of the decision in accordance with paragraph one, of all measures, if any, taken or being taken by the State Party to implement the decision of the Commission. 3. Within ninety (90) days of receipt of the State's written response, the Commission may invite the State concerned to submit further information on the measures it has taken in response to its decision. If no response is received from the State, the Commission may send a reminder to the State Party concerned to submit its information within ninety (90) days from the date of the reminder. 5. The Rapporteur for the Communication, or any other member of the Commission designated for this purpose, shall monitor the measures taken by the State Party to give effect to the Commission's recommendations on each Communication. 6. The Rapporteur may make such contacts and take such action as may be appropriate to fulfill his/her assignment including recommendations for further action by the Commission as may be necessary. 7. At each Ordinary Session, the Rapporteur shall present the report during the Public Session on the implementation of the Commission's recommendations. 8. The Commission shall draw the attention of the Sub-Committee of the Permanent Representatives Committee and the Executive Council on the Implementation of the Decisions of the African Union, to any situations of non-compliance with the Commission's decisions. 9. The Commission shall include information on any follow-up activities in its Activity Report.
In setting out when the African Commission is able to submit a case to the African Court, Rule 118 (1) and (2) provides that this can be done where the African Commission 'considers that the State has not complied or is unwilling to comply with its recommendations in respect of the communication within the period stated in Rule 112(2)' and where it 'considers that the State has not complied with the Provisional Measures requested'. Rule 125 enables the African Commission to request the AU Assembly, when it submits its activity report, 'to take necessary measures to implement its decisions' and for the African Commission to 'bring all its recommendations to the attention of the Sub-Committee on the Implementation of the Decisions of the African Union of the Permanent Representatives Committee'.
Article 29(2) of the Protocol on the African Court states that the now Executive Council of the AU 'shall also be notified of the judgment and shall monitor its execution on behalf of the Assembly'. Under Article 30 States Parties are required to 'comply with the judgment in any case to which they are parties within the time stipulated by the Court and to guarantee its execution' and in compliance with Article 31 the Court shall submit a report to each regular session of the Assembly which should include 'the cases in which a State has not complied with the Court's judgment'.
Rule 51 of the Rules of Court notes that the Article 31 report shall also include reference to the interim measures ordered by the Court and [i]n the event of non-compliance with these measures by the State concerned, the Court shall make all such recommendations as it deems appropriate' and it can also 'invite the parties to provide it with information on any issue relating to implementation of the interim measures adopted by it'. Rule 54(5) of Rules of Court enables the Court to 'invite the parties to provide it with information on any issue relating to implementation of the interim measures adopted by it'.
D. Mechanisms
The challenge with monitoring implementation of the judgments of the African Court and decisions of the African Commission does not appear to be due to the lack of available mechanisms to do so. In addition to any specific procedure or mechanism to deal with monitoring, these bodies have also used their existing procedures to monitor implementation of their judgments and decisions. So the African Commission has asked questions of States during the examination of their Article 62 reports about what measures have been taken to implement decisions; it has amended the structure of its activity reports to refer to the implementation status of decisions; 8 it has included follow-up on decisions in its fact-finding missions by special procedures 9 and its promotional missions; 10 and made reference to the status of implementation of decisions in country-specific resolutions. 12 The procedure is in effect a new application, for interpretation of a judgment, as set out in Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. Here, however, the roles are reversed: the State then becoming the applicant, and the previous applicant, the Respondent.
Are such processes insufficient or simply not properly used? Why, given the above tools, has the African Commission, for example, not produced publicly available information on the status of implementation of at least some of its decisions? In part, the processes do not appear to have been exploited to their full potential due to limited information from States, and insufficient staffing resources, among other factors. In addition, there are also key processes/tools behind the scenes which are missing, such as efficient and comprehensive case management systems/databases which if in place would help the monitoring overall. The task of follow-up and monitoring implementation has been added on to already existing processes/work but with limited if any additional resources.
In addition to existing processes, specific mechanisms have also been established to enable the bodies themselves to monitor implementation of their decisions and judgments. These, as will be seen, encompass many of the types of monitoring that are listed above. Rule 112 of the African Commission's Rules of Procedure sets out the procedure for 'follow-up' to be used by the African Commission. Here its role includes reporting, information-gathering, assessment and arguably enforcement and is not only reactive but also proactive. These roles have principally been coordinated by the African Commission's Working Group on Communications, composed of Commissioners and members of the secretariat, which is tasked with considering communications.
13 Its mandate was expanded in October 2012 to include the coordination of follow-up of decisions and [collecting] 'information on the status of implementation of the Commission's decisions' which it should then present in a report at each session. providing it with the information on 'non-compliance' in its activity report. 15 In a 2014 Decision, the Executive Council called on the African Court to 'propose, for consideration by the PRC, a concrete reporting mechanism that will enable it to bring to the attention of relevant policy organs, situations of non-compliance and/or any other issues within its mandate, at any time, when the interests of justice so require'.
16 It has been suggested that 'reporting' should be considered as separate from 'monitoring' and 'enforcement'.
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'Reporting' includes those reports on non-compliance submitted by the African Court to the Executive Council through Article 31 of the Protocol. 'Monitoring' should be undertaken by the Executive Council in accordance with Article 29; and include the ability of the Executive Council, through working groups or a group specifically for 'ongoing supervision of the state of execution of judicial decisions of the Court', to issue regulations or directions or appropriate action. 18 'Enforcement' will then be carried out by the Assembly of the AU, with information on the measures taken by the State being maintained by a register at the AU Commission.
19
The practice of the African Commission and the African Court reveals that they employ a range of different tasks to monitor implementation. With respect to information gathering, the African Commission has received information from one or both parties to the communication, 20 and on occasion others, 21 on the extent to which its recommendations have been implemented. It has also been more active in gathering evidence of implementation, for example, by sending Notes Verbales and letters to the States and parties requesting information, although the responses are not always provided. 22 Despite it not being expressly mentioned in Rule 112, it has also held hearings on implementation 23 and held a panel on implementation as part of its plenary sessions. For example, at the 53 rd ordinary session of the African Commission in April 2013, the Commission held an implementation hearing in respect of the Endorois case. During the hearing, the parties updated the Commission on the implementation of its decision in the Endorois case.
25 Thereafter, the Commission sent a Note Verbale dated 29 April 2013 to the government of Kenya reminding the government of its pledge during the oral hearing to submit an interim report within 90 days of the hearing and a comprehensive report at the next session (54 th ordinary session) of the Commission. 26 The oral hearing on implementation was followed by a workshop held on 23 September 2013 on the status of implementation of the Endorois decision, organised by the African Commission's Working Group on Indigenous Populations/Communities in collaboration with the Endorois Welfare Council. 27 Due to the failure of the government of Kenya to participate in the implementation workshop and provide feedback as promised during the oral hearing, the Commission adopted Resolution 257 on 5 November 2013 urging the government of Kenya to comply with its obligations under the African Charter by implementing the Endorois decision.
With respect to reporting as a tool for monitoring implementation, the African Commission's annual report, which includes the annexes of the decisions on communications, has for a number of years included a section outlining 'the situation of the compliance with its recommendations by the State Parties'.
28 This is consolidated by requests from the Executive Council that 'Parties to Communications to provide the ACHPR with information regarding implementation of decisions and recommendations of the ACHPR'.
29 The African Court publishes in its activity report a list of States and increasingly detailed information on implementation. 30 The information lists the particular reparation ordered by the Court and then provides detail on what the State has done, if anything, to implement that measure. In one situation, with respect to Libya, it adopted an Interim Report' which noted that 'Libya has failed to comply with a judgment of the Court'.
31 It submitted this report to the Assembly of the AU in accordance with Article 31 of the Protocol and Rule 51(4) of the Rules of Court, recommending that 'the Assembly to express itself on Libya's non-compliance with the Court Order and to call upon Libya to comply forthwith and, also for Libya to report to the Court within 14 days on what measures Libya has taken to comply with the Court Order; the Assembly to adopt a decision calling upon all Member States of the African Union to comply with and implement Judgments and Orders of the Court, in accordance with Article 30 of the Protocol; the Assembly to take such other measures as it deems appropriate to ensure that Libya fully complies with the Court Order'. The African Commission can offer its good offices to parties to a communication and facilitate dialogue between them in the implementation of its decisions. 33 Whether the parties make use of this potential as often as they might is a question to be considered further.
In carrying out its role under the Protocol and the Rules of Court, the African Court has required, as part of the judgment or Ruling in Reparations, for States to report back to it within a period of time on the measures they have taken to implement the judgment. 34 The African Court, we were informed, also writes to States to request information and regularly updates this information. Neither the African Commission nor African Court appear to have an electronic case management database which incorporates data on the implementation of the decisions and rulings.
Both the African Court and the African Commission have then used any information they have collated to make an assessment on the extent to which the State has implemented the judgment or decision. For the African Commission this is not done consistently. For example, there are only a handful of cases where the African Commission has made more detailed analysis and statements on a State's failure to implement, prompted, it would appear, by sustained campaigns from the litigants or interested civil society organisations.
35
The African Court has not published any criteria on what amounts to 'full' or 'partial' implementation, although it has used these terms. For example '[w] hile welcoming the efforts made by Burkina Faso and Tanzania to implement the Court's judgments, the Court notes that the two countries are yet to fully comply with the orders of the Court in those judgments, and further notes Tanzania's unwillingness to comply with the Court's Orders for Provisional Measures'.
36
This terminology could, however, be read as relating to the number of specific orders in the judgment, rather than an assessment of the nature of the measures taken with respect to each particular order.
There is no information that is consistently publicly available on how the African Commission or African Court assess the accuracy or test the veracity of information given to them on the extent to which the State has implemented the decision or judgment. In the end it may come down to whether the complainant or applicant accepts and is content with what the State claims it has done.
E. Conclusions
Although findings are still at a preliminary stage, our research asserts the following conclusions. It reveals that although the body monitoring implementation, in our context, the African Commission or the African Court, is expected to play various roles, there appears to be no coherent or strategic approach. are times at which none of these tasks are being carried out because the bodies do not consider it their responsibility to do so. Secondly, many of these tasks are being carried out but not well or consistently well. Thirdly, there is no coherent picture from those within or outside the bodies as to whether these roles are appropriate or not, whether they themselves are best placed to play them, play them on some occasions and not others, or whether others should be doing these tasks instead. Finally, one of the reasons why the African Court and African Commission appear to be carrying out the variety of monitoring activities is because they are doing so in lieu of a more holistic and coherent system being put in place, particularly at the AU level. The sub-committee envisaged by Rule 112 (8) 39 Rather our research has found that the reasons why the decision or judgment will be implemented are more complex. They include the current political context such as whether there has been a change in government; the particularly sensitivity of the issues in the decision/judgment versus what is happening in the State at the time; what kind of remedies the decision/judgment requires; and the practical feasibility of carrying them out. Sometimes States may well have implemented, at least in part, a decision or judgment but this is not information that is known publicly. Other factors include consideration of the specificity of the recommendations or orders made by the African Commission and Court and whether a correct balance was made between providing clarity to the State on what precisely was required of it to implement the decision, as against giving it the discretion to determine what was the most appropriate way of implementing within the context of the State. 40 We recognise that detailed consideration of all of these issues relies on some structural reform at not only the levels of the bodies themselves but also at the AU. Equally, clarity on respective roles impacts on basic procedural issues. For example, research elsewhere, and our preliminary findings support this, indicates that the visibility of the decision and judgment as well as what the State may or may not have done to implement it, is crucial to successful implementation. Yet, it is not always clear whose responsibility it is to publicise the decision, inform others beyond the parties, and make national, regional and international actors aware of what the State has done to implement. As noted above, the African Court is providing detail in its activity reports on the measures taken by the States to implement its judgments. The African Commission, in contrast, has been more hesitant in taking an active role in disseminating, beyond the parties to the case, information on the decision or judgment and the level of its implementation. Relatedly, decisions are now not attached to the African Commission's activity reports, as they had been in the past. The African Commission may also delay the process of finalising the final text of the decision, thus introducing further uncertainty and lack of clarity about when the State and parties have been 'informed' of the Commission's decision.
There is clear acknowledgment by those within and outside the African Court and African Commission that monitoring implementation is not working as well as it could be. The African Court noted in its 2017 mid-term report listed among its challenges the non-implementation of its decisions, including refusals to implement, failure to inform the Court of what measures have been taken, and the slow-pace' or 'reluctance' to comply. 41 Similarly, the African Commission has recently 'lamented the low compliance rate' of States with its decisions. 42 Yet, there is also an impasse, certainly at the level of the African Commission, in terms of what steps should now be taken to put in place a coherent and effective system. Whilst admirable that time is being taken to consider these issues, this is also frustrating. Even if a cohesive approach can be found, it will not be quick. In the meantime, victims are still awaiting justice on the remedies already recommended and ordered. We therefore consider that there are various practical and immediate steps that can be taken to enhance the monitoring process.
Leaving aside proper consideration of what roles these bodies should undertake, our research has found that at the very least the African Commission and the African Court should gather information about implementation. Both the Commission and Court have the competence to do so within their existing Rules of Procedure. A reactive role requires no immediate additional resources and indeed, the bodies appear already to be carrying this out, albeit not consistently or comprehensively. However, a proactive information-gathering role requires a little more thought and necessitates actively seeking out information, on a regular basis, from the parties but also other actors at the national, regional and international levels.
Secondly, an internal case management system which includes information on the measures taken by the State to implement the decision or judgment could assist the African Commission and African Court in keeping track on the sources of evidence, the timeframe in which any measures may have been taken, and enable this data to be cross-referenced with other records that they may hold on that State.
Finally, one of the challenges, certainly for the African Commission which has many more decisions than the Court, appears to have been the difficulty in prioritising which communications it should focus its efforts in monitoring implementation. It is suggested that the African Commission could use a 'pilot' approach, starting with a handful of communications around which it could develop a strategy and which it could use to consider what role or roles it is best placed to play. In due course, the African Commission may also consider the need to establish a dedicated rapporteur or working group specifically on monitoring implementation of its decisions. This may be preferable to having the Working Group on Communications also oversee implementation.
These suggestions are very modest, and are certainly not sufficient, but could be part of broader and more ambitious moves to take monitoring of implementation forward.
